WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Weapons crossing the border from Iran to Afghanistan may be winding up in the hands of the Taliban, the hard-line Islamic militia that is battling U.S.- and NATO-led forces in Afghanistan, U.S. and British officials said.

Coalition officials in Afghanistan said they have intercepted Iranian-made AK-47s, C-4 plastic explosives and mortars. One explosively-formed penetrator bomb (EFP) that was found can pierce American armor, a NATO official said.

The EFP is similar to the weaponry the United States says Iran has provided to militants in Iraq, but the NATO official said the weapon has not been traced directly to the Iranian regime.

Some analysts question whether the top echelons of the Iranian government are behind any transfer of arms from the Islamic Republic to the Taliban, Iran's long-time foe. Rogue elements -- perhaps the Quds force of Iran's Revolutionary Guard -- may be operating on their own, the analysts suggest. (Watch what analysts say this development could mean

But a U.S. official who requested anonymity told CNN the United States believes Iran's supreme leaders know about these operations and could stop them if they wanted to.

Another U.S. official said Iran still sees the Taliban as an enemy but has a history of dealing with people it considers "nasty" as long as it is "congruent with Iran's overall objectives." In this case, Iran is "working the Taliban angle" to "bleed the U.S." in Afghanistan, the official said.

The British government called any provision of arms by Iran to the Taliban "unacceptable."

"We know about illegal movements of munitions across the border from Iran to Afghanistan, destined for the Taliban," the British Ministry of Defense said in a statement. "We are concerned that some of these munitions are of Iranian origin."

A former U.S. intelligence official said Iranian activities in Afghanistan would be a disturbing development.

"That suggests the Iranians are now turning up the pressure on the NATO forces in Afghanistan," said former national security official Bruce Riedel. "Since Iran has one of the most extensive intelligence networks in the entire country, they would have an enormous capability to cause mischief."

Denial by Iran

An Iranian official at the United Nations denied his country is giving weapons to the Taliban, noting that the Iranian government has long supported Afghan President Hamid Karzai and has always seen the Taliban as an enemy.

Both U.S. officials and outside analysts said any malicious intentions on Iran's part would only be directed at the United States. The majority-Shiite Iran would not want the Taliban to gain too much strength, they said.

"Iran and the Taliban nearly went to war in 1998 over the killing of 11 Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan," said Afshin Molavi of the New American Foundation, a non-profit, public policy institute based in Washington. "And the Taliban are also virulently anti-Shiite. So if these allegations are true, Iran is playing a very dangerous and delicate game."

One analyst called it a game of "managed chaos," just enough to bloody America's nose in Afghanistan.

North Korea Stays Mum on Nuclear Weapons as Talks Open With South

By Kurt Achin
Seoul
30 May 2007

North and South Korea have formally opened high-level talks in Seoul, but delegates from the North are remaining silent so far about Pyongyang's commitment to dismantle its nuclear programs. VOA's Kurt Achin reports from the South Korean capital.

At Wednesday's opening session of minister-level talks between the two Koreas, South Korea told the North the two countries' relationship depends on Pyongyang implementing a promise it made in February to begin shutting down its nuclear weapons program.

Koh Kyoung-bin is a spokesman for South Korea's Unification Ministry.

Koh says in Wednesday's opening remarks, South Korean delegates told the North that mutual trust and cooperation is linked to Pyongyang's implementation of the February nuclear agreement.

Pyongyang promised during talks in Beijing with South Korea, Russia, China, Japan and the United States that it would shut down its main nuclear production facility within 60 days.

That deadline passed without action more than a month and a half ago, however, with Pyongyang citing a technical banking issue involving funds frozen in a Macau bank as the reason for its delay.

Spokesman Koh says the North Korean delegates made no mention whatsoever of the nuclear issue in their opening remarks Wednesday.

He says the only verbal references of any kind to the nuclear issue at the Wednesday morning session came from the South Korean side.

North Korea also did not initially bring up a South Korean promise of massive aid in the form of rice and light industrial supplies. South Korean officials have said they would delay shipping that aid until Pyongyang starts implementing the February agreement.

Instead, North Korea spoke favorably about the range of inter-Korean joint projects that have been established since the two countries held their first and only summit in 2000. Koh says the North Korean delegates urged the South to keep inter-Korean relations independent of influence from "outside powers."

He says the North Koreans called on the South to stop antagonizing the North by staging joint military drills with the United States.

The United States stations about 28,000 troops here in South Korea to deter a repeat of North Korea's 1950 invasion. The three-year war that resulted from that invasion has never come to a formal end: fighting was halted by a "temporary" armistice in 1953.

ASSEMBLY OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

The state of affairs in disarmament (CFE, nuclear disarmament)

===========================================================

REPORT ⁽¹⁾

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee

Part 4 (5 parts)

IV. Nuclear arms reductions and nuclear disarmament

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and dismantling of the Soviet Union have radically changed the political landscape and, as a corollary, the way in which nuclear armaments are perceived. Now that the massive-scale threat has ceased to exist, nuclear weapons have lost their immediate military function which was based on east-west confrontation. They may not seem appropriate to meet the new challenges of the post-cold war period.

At the same time the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War have directed international attention to the new dangers of proliferation, with nuclear anarchy threatening to replace the nuclear order of the cold war. Major efforts are still under way with a view to reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing further proliferation.

The countries of Latin America, south-west Asia and southern Africa have pledged never to develop or use nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers for their part have considerably reduced their arsenals and demonstrated their commitment to continuing along the road towards disarmament by approving the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet we are far from living in a denuclearised world. Indeed, Russia and the United States are still each keeping more than 3 500 strategic nuclear warheads operational and will hold as many again in strategic reserve. Even if the START II Treaty is ratified, proliferation may continue and tactical nuclear weapons are still excluded from any reduction treaty. Moreover, not only has Russia not reduced, it has even strengthened, the role of nuclear weapons in its defence concept. The world’s fifth declared nuclear power, China, remains totally aloof from the disarmament process and is even in the process of modernising and expanding its nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear armaments have always had an important role as a political instrument. During the cold war they were symbolic, within the Alliance, of the absolute guarantee by the United States of security in Europe, while France and the United Kingdom used the possession of nuclear weapons to assert their national sovereignty. Nuclear armaments remain a key component of western security, even if they are considered to be the very last bastion against the resurgence of major conflicts. If Europe wishes to build a European defence identity, the nuclear dimension will necessarily be part of the debate.

Doubts about the significance and ultimate purpose of nuclear armaments are gaining ground among the political classes. The fragility of the nuclear consensus is all the more worrying given that the new strategic role of nuclear weapons remains to be defined.

Thus it may become increasingly difficult to justify nuclear armaments. There is a strong possibility that the five-yearly NPT review conferences and annual meetings of the preparatory committee will turn into a quasi standing tribunal in the focus of media attention at which nuclear countries will have to justify themselves to non-nuclear countries. The Group of 21 and countries like Australia, New Zealand and Sweden, will not tire of calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and will make skilful use of the various UN fora such as the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to promote this aim. While Russia, China and non-declared nuclear countries such as Israel, Pakistan and India are unlikely to let themselves be swayed by such demands, the role and utilisation of such weapons has become an issue in many western countries for whom a world without nuclear weapons is not a wild fancy. The question of whether such weapons serve a useful purpose is once again very much on the agenda.

(ii) The START Treaties

In the light of these new developments, the United States and Russia realised that their nuclear armaments levels were too high and this prompted them to negotiate agreements on strategic nuclear armaments reductions. The START I and START II Treaties were the result of these negotiations.

The first START Treaty was signed in Moscow on 20 July 1991 by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev after more than six years of negotiations. The Treaty made provision for a reduction in nuclear forces to no more than 1 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6 000 treaty-accountable warheads, of which no more than 4 900 may be deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles by the end of the treaty implementation period on 5 December 2001. It cut back considerably on intercontinental ballistic missiles and their associated launchers and charges, on the launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their warheads, and on heavy bombers and their weapons systems, including long-range nuclear cruise missiles.

Ratification of the START I Treaty was delayed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and by the Supreme Soviet dissolving itself on 26 December 1991. On 1 October 1992, the US Senate agreed to ratify the Treaty pending final settlement of the provisions for its application by four newly independent republics (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). Russia ratified the Treaty on 4 November 1992 but held up the exchange of the instruments of ratification until Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan had subscribed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and made arrangements for implementation of the Treaty. For the purposes of the NPT, Russia took over from the USSR as the state with a nuclear weapons holding (Lisbon Protocol, 23 May 1992). The START I Treaty was ratified by Kazakhstan on 2 July 1992, by Belarus on 4 February 1993 and by Ukraine in November 1993. Notwithstanding the complications in implementing the Treaty owing to the economic, technical and political problems involved in repatriating Ukraine’s nuclear arsenals to Russia, the Treaty has already resulted in a substantial reduction in the number of strategic weapons. On the occasion of the 15th session of the Russian-American Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), which took place in Geneva in May and June 1997, it was declared that the implementation of the START I Treaty was "ahead of schedule" ⁽¹¹⁾.

The START II Treaty was the subject of "common agreement" at the Bush-Yeltsin summit on 17 June 1992 and provided for a two-thirds reduction of strategic force levels as against those which existed at the beginning of the 1990s. It was signed on 3 January 1993.

Besides the considerable quantitative reductions foreseen by the Treaty, its most important component from the American standpoint was the elimination of all land-based strategic ballistic missiles with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Under the Treaty, the production and deployment of MIRV missiles would be banned as of 1 January 2008 and all the launchers of such missiles, including those used for training and tests, would have to be destroyed or converted into single-warhead missile launchers.

This complied with an American demand making strategic stability contingent on a concerted reduction of surface-to-surface multiple warhead missiles which it considered to be the most destabilising weapons in the nuclear arsenals.

There are two exceptions to this rule which take account of Russia’s particular situation and should facilitate the reconstruction of its strategic potential, the backbone of which is its surface-to-surface MIRV missiles.

First of all, all Minuteman 3 missiles (three warheads) and 105 of the 170 SS-19 missiles (six warheads) may be maintained, provided that they are converted to single-warhead missiles. Furthermore, 20 launchers remain available to both parties in order to put spacecraft into orbit, and the Russians are authorised to convert 90 SS-18 missile silos to house missiles carrying warheads of the SS-25 type. The configuration of the new silos will be such that they cannot be used in the future to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles. Inspections will provide firm guarantees in this respect.

The START II verification procedure, involving a wide range of remote-sensing and on-the-spot observation techniques, will ensure that commitments are complied with. However, almost two years elapsed before the entry into force of the START I Treaty on 5 December 1994, and it was only in 1995 that the START II ratification procedure started. The American Senate ratified the Treaty on 26 January 1996 and ratification by the Duma in Russia is still posing problems (see next chapter).

The signing of the START II Treaty in Moscow on 3 January 1993 was hailed as a decisive breakthrough on the nuclear disarmament front and its entry into force was to be the first step in a process of transforming relations bet-ween the two protagonists of the cold war. Once it had been completed, the security of Russia and the United States would no longer depend on holding gigantic arsenals that had to be regularly modernised but would rather result from a pro-cess of "cooperative denuclearisation", with the ultimate aim of establishing strategic parity at sufficient levels of armaments. However, it has to be admitted that these promises have not been kept and that strategic arms reductions are still a far cry from the aims of the START negotiators.

The dissolution of the USSR and the problems connected with eliminating strategic armaments deployed on the territories of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have delayed entry into force of the START I Treaty, which in turn means that ratification of the START II Treaty, which was the next step in the procedure, could only enter an active phase at the beginning of 1995.

(iii) The reasons for Russia’s reluctance
to ratify the START II Treaty

The START II Treaty has stirred controversy within Russia’s political classes and parliament. Many politicians and experts consider that it constitutes a threat to Russian security. For instance, the Director of the geopolitical and military forecasting centre in Moscow, Alexei Arbatov, has pointed out that the START II Treaty means destroying surface-to-surface intercontinental MIRV missiles which are the core of Russian strategic forces, while the United States is authorised to maintain its Trident 2 sea-to-surface ballistic missiles which also constitute a counter-force capability. Given that Russia does not possess sea-to-surface systems equivalent to the Trident and that its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) fleet is more vulnerable than that of the United States to anti-submarine warfare techniques, the dismantling of its surface-to-surface MIRV missiles would deprive it of a counter-force capability.

The second element of the debate concerns the financial consequences of the Treaty. The Russians claim that it is expensive to destroy nuclear warheads and that there is pressure on their financial resources. Moreover they are obliged to restructure their strategic arsenal in order to comply with the obligations of the START II Treaty, and to replace, at an exorbitantly high cost, their SS-18 and SS-19 missiles with single-warhead SS-25 missiles. In order to maintain an armaments level compatible with the final ceilings of START II, Russia would have to produce and deploy nearly 500 new surface missiles at a rate of 80 or 90 a year until 2008. At the moment it deploys about ten a year and is unlikely to exceed this limit. Furthermore the maintenance costs for additional mobile surface-to-surface missiles would be six times higher than those of the surface-to-surface intercontinental missiles that they would be replacing.

Finally, according to the most optimistic forecasts, Russian GDP will grow by 25 to 30% over the next five years and military budgets will hardly exceed the level of 20 billion dollars. Since one third of that sum will have to be spent on improving the situation of Russian army personnel, the amount of money available for converting the strategic arsenal is likely to be insufficient.

Military experts contend that the START II Treaty will not only emasculate Russian strategic forces but that their response capability will also be weakened by the concomitant development of an American anti-missile defence system. Their observation that six of the eleven radar that used to be available to the USSR are now outside Russian territory, while the Krasnoyarsk radar would have to be dismantled, is a point that must be taken on board in any assessment of the balance of power. In the same vein, Admiral Rudolf Golosov has remarked that one cannot ignore the vulnerability of Russian strategic forces to strikes by high-precision conventional weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise missiles that the Americans have already deployed on ships and submarines. Moreover, as the Russians see it, parity must be based on a qualitatively equivalent strategic capability on either side, and on the possibility of responding effectively to an offensive attack by enemy forces.

These difficulties shed uncertainty on the ratification of the START II Treaty, although some people have pointed out that the cost of the operation could be offset by later savings on strategic forces running costs. An unofficial esti-mate of the cost of implementing START I sets the figure at 30 billion roubles, to which must be added a further 7 to 10 billion roubles for START II. However, the cost of maintaining the strategic forces would be brought down from its present level of 20 billion roubles per year to 15 billion, once the agreed reductions had been implemented.

In order to assist Russia with the implementation of the START Treaties, the United States has established a financial programme bearing the same name as the Nunn-Lugar amendment. The prevailing attitude in Russia, however, is one of scepticism, given that the funds are meted out very sparingly and that the main beneficiaries are American consultants and service companies.

Another area of concern for the Russian leadership is the possible American deployment of an antimissile defence system to protect the national territory. Indeed, the Republican opposition has expressed approval for such a pro-ject, and the fact that the date of deployment of the hypothetical NMD (2003) coincides with that of the planned completion of the reductions under START II only aggravates Russian fears of an erosion of their response capability by the end of the disarmament process. Furthermore, while accepting the legitimacy of setting up a system of defence against theatre missiles under the ABM Treaty, the Kremlin authorities are concerned that the performance of high-velocity anti-missile missiles will constitute a threat to their strategic missiles. This explains their insistence upon a clear dividing line between theatre missile defence systems, which would be authorised, and strategic missile defence systems, which would have to comply with the restrictions of the ABM Treaty.

NATO enlargement may also jeopardise ratification of the Treaty. Russia will have to adopt special measures to accommodate the fact that 80% of its strategic potential will be within the range of NATO bombers and that the credibility of its nuclear response capability will be limited by the planned START II reductions.

In conclusion, the Duma has laid down two conditions for ratifying the START II Treaty:

In order to adapt the rate of reductions to Russia’s economic circumstances, the deadlines were recently prolonged by five years following an agreement concluded between Russia and the United States on 26 September 1997.

On that date, the United States agreed to push back the effective date of the START II Treaty by five years, thereby clearing the way for negotiating a further reduction of strategic arsenals in the framework of a START III Treaty. The agreement signed with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia allowed the United States to develop missile defence systems not exceeding a speed of 3 km/second under the 1972 ABM Treaty. Such systems include Theatre High Altitude Area Defence Systems.

(iv) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

On 24 September 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in New York. This Treaty imposes a total ban on the explosion of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space, under water and under the ground. It takes over the main provisions of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, prohibiting the carrying out of "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" and urging each party "to prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control". Each party must furthermore refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in such explosions (Article I). In recognition of the difficulty of such an undertaking, it was further stipulated that should the Treaty not take effect on the third anniversary of its opening for signature, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with whom the Treaty is deposited, would convene a conference at the request of the majority of states already having deposited their ratification instruments, and attended by them, at which it would be decided by consensus which measures could be adopted, in compliance with international law, to speed up the ratification process. This procedure would be repeated each year in the hope of persuading recalcitrant countries to accede to the Treaty. Threshold countries could resist international pressure, as indeed they did when they opposed the NPT. However, a CTBT signed and ratified by a large number of states would be an international reference even before its entry into force. As is the case for other arms control agreements, there is provision for a state wishing to withdraw from its obligations, but only in the event of extraordinary circumstances which jeopardise its supreme interests. The party wishing to withdraw must in that case give advance notice of its intentions and justify its course of action. Russia announced that it would withdraw from the Treaty in order to carry out tests if it had no other means at its disposal of checking the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons. Such interpretations of a country’s "supreme" interests could lead to arbitrary decisions outside of international verification procedures.

In order to ensure implementation of the Treaty and organise a framework within which signatory states can consult and cooperate with each other, a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation is to be established in Vienna. It is to be composed of the Conference of Participating States, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. The Executive Council, which is to play a leading political role in the decision-making process, will be composed of 51 members from six different geographic regions. The Technical Secretariat will consist of a Director General plus the requisite scientific, technical and other staff.

The international monitoring system responsible for checking compliance with the Treaty will include seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasonic equipment. The system will be supported by an International Data Centre attached to the Technical Secretariat. The syn-ergy between these different technologies will make it possible to verify activities below the power of one kilotonne, which is the seismic de-tectability threshold that was adopted.

On-the-spot international verification can be called for with regard to any state carrying out suspicious and non-justified activities. Such a request must be backed up by information collected by the international monitoring system, by any relevant technical information obtained by means of national verification systems in accordance with the generally recognised principles of international law, or by a combination of both.

Ten years after entry into force of the Treaty, a conference of signatories will be convened in order to examine its mode of operation and effectiveness. The Conference of Participating States, the main body of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, will hold regular annual meetings to review any points, questions or problems within the scope of the Treaty. A preparatory committee comprising representatives of all signatories will be responsible for preparing CTBT implementation and for organising the first session of the Conference of Participating States. It will have international organisation status.

The Treaty, which has unlimited duration, will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification of all the states listed in its annex, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. The annex contains a list of 44 states which participated in the Conference on Disarmament on 18 June 1996 and in the preparatory work for the 1996 session, and which possess nuclear power stations or research centres. The "threshold" states are included in the list because they match the stated criteria.

On 10 September 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the CTBT as negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament and instructed the UN Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for governments to sign the Treaty. The decision was adopted by 158 votes for, 3 against (India, Bhutan and Libya) and 5 abstentions (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria and Tanzania). Nineteen delegations from UN member countries were absent or not authorised to vote due to late payment of their dues to the Organisation. To date, 146 countries have signed the Treaty. The ratification process has started, but none of the five superpowers has ratified it yet.

India has announced that it does not subscribe to the planned Treaty and will not participate in the envisaged monitoring system. It does not consider the Treaty to be a step towards universal nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it considers that the terms of the Treaty are unacceptable in that they impinge on its sovereign right to decide, in light of its national interests, whether or not to accede to it. Pakistan approved the Resolution but specified that it would only sign the Treaty if India did likewise. The procedure which was followed, unprecedented in the history of the Conference on Disarmament, will certainly have an impact on the future of the Conference.

The international community’s main concerns about nuclear tests relate to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the race for a qualitative improvement of nuclear arsenals and radioactive contamination of man’s environment.

These days it is possible, with no prior testing, for any state with its own technology base or with sufficient financial resources to acquire the technology to manufacture relatively simple atomic fission systems. However, by imposing a test ban on all signatories, the CTBT may strengthen the NTP, since it rectifies a major imbalance between the rights and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear states. This balance cannot be appreciated until all threshold countries have officially acceded to the CTBT.

Testing is necessary not only to modernise the first two generations of nuclear weapons, but also to develop "third generation" nuclear weapons, which aim for a new degree of perfection in the nuclear fission and fusion techniques used, with a view to providing such weapons with special effects.

Thus an end to nuclear tests will be beneficial in terms of arms control in that it will prevent any substantial qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons. A test ban will also make it highly unlikely that completely new and unforeseen phenomena will arise in the nuclear weapons field.

On 15 May, then on 17 August 1995, China performed two underground nuclear tests, its 42nd and 43rd since 1964, on the Lop Nor site in Xinjiang province. These tests were condemned by the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia as well as by Australia, Japan and South Korea. China has now developed a new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Dongfeng 31, with an estimated range of 8 000 km, which means that it is capable for the first time of reaching Europe and the east coast of the United States. France carried out six nuclear tests from 5 September 1995 onwards in Mururoa, in order to check the security of its deterrent force. The third explosion, detonated on 28 October, had a force equivalent to 110 000 tonnes of TNT. The French tests were criticised by New Zealand, Australia, the Pacific states, Japan, Russia and the United States.

(v) Prolongation of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The representatives of the 175 signatories of the NPT, which was signed in 1968, met from 17 April to 12 May 1995 in order to review and prolong the Treaty. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom) unanimously adopted Resolution 984 providing for assistance to non-nuclear states which might be victims of a nuclear attack. The United States and the United Kingdom announced that they would stop the production of plutonium and of uranium enriched for military purposes. The decision to prolong the Treaty indefinitely was taken on 11 May by 175 of the 178 signatories of the NPT. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kiribati and Taiwan were absent from the Conference. Three documents were adopted. The first imposed additional obligations on member states, including nuclear disarmament, and called on all parties to put an end to nuclear tests once and for all in 1996. The second established a disarmament monitoring procedure. The third, at the initiative of 14 Arab states, called for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and the accession "without exception" of all states of the Middle East to the NPT. In order to obtain an unlimited prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear powers agreed to several obligations. Inter alia they specified – and to a large extent harmonised – their "negative security guarantees" and pledged to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against those countries which did not possess such weapons. Strong pressure is currently being brought to bear in the framework of the Geneva disarmament negotiations to move from these unilateral commitments to the stage of a more legally binding multilateral agreement.

(vi) Nuclear arms reduction in Europe

By comparison with the cold-war situation, the numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe have been substantially reduced. Russia has withdrawn from the European theatre all the tactical nuclear weapons belonging to the former Soviet Union, and the United States now only has 150 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs left in Europe. The United Kingdom is in the process of dismantling its WE-177 bombs, while France has decided to scrap all its ground-to-ground nuclear systems.

The new geopolitical realities in Europe have considerably reduced the likelihood of a conflict involving nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

Atlantic Alliance members have adapted their defence arrangements to the new reality. Nuclear forces have been scaled down and restructured from a conceptual and operational point of view. The doctrinal differences of the cold war have practically disappeared and the three Alliance nuclear powers are in agreement over the broad thrust of nuclear deterrence. The United States, the United Kingdom and France regard nuclear weapons more than ever as political instruments within the framework of deterrence based on a smaller arsenal. Their functions are limited to counterbalancing nuclear arsenals elsewhere in the world and offering a supplementary option to dissuade possible proliferants from using NBC weapons. To compensate for any inadequacies in nuclear deterrence in the face of rudimentary NBC arsenals, the three powers are seeking ways of conventionalising the lower stages of deterrence by deploying high-precision conventional weapons with high-powered explosive charges which are capable of producing satisfactory results, without the undesirable effects of their nuclear counterparts.

Despite the reductions, the West’s deterrence system has survived the end of the cold war. NATO’s collective potential still consists of American and British nuclear weapons. The United States still maintains 150 sub-strategic weapons in western Europe. These symbolise the Allies’ nuclear solidarity and maintain the strategic coupling between Europe and the United States. The United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey have the installations and infrastructure to accommodate American nuclear weapons.

The United Kingdom has now abandoned its WE-177 nuclear bombs. It intends to rely solely on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and thus will be the only nuclear power whose deterrent force is made up of a single component. The British Navy is in the process of modernising its fleet of submarines by acquiring four "Vanguard" class vessels. The submarines are equipped with Trident missiles whose accuracy, range and flexibility are far superior to those of their Polaris predecessors. Because of these characteristics, Trident can be used for both substrategic and strategic missions. The number of nuclear warheads on board each submarine will be reduced from 128 to a maximum of 96.

France has also abandoned the Hades missile and medium-range ground-to-ground missiles. Its deterrent force will in future be based solely on submarine and air components. Under the nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine programme, France is to commission four "Triomphant" class submarines, with the first coming into service around 2005. Each submarine will be equipped with 16 M-45 missiles carrying 6 nuclear TN-75 warheads. The M-51 missile, fitted with a new nuclear warhead, is to replace the M-45 from 2010. The airborne component consists of three Mirage 2000N squadrons and two Super Etendard Navy flotilla, equipped with medium-range air-to-ground missiles (ASMP). From 2000, these aircraft will be phased out and replaced by Rafales. From 2008, the ASMP-Plus will take over from the ASMP. It will have a range of 100 km at low altitude and 500 km at high altitude (as against 80 and 300 km for the ASMP).

On 26 July 1994, France and the United Kingdom decided that the joint Anglo-French Committee on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, established provisionally in October 1992, should have permanent status. The Committee, which brings together senior civil servants from the French and British Foreign and Defence ministries, has made a comparison of the two countries’ attitudes to the role of deterrence, nuclear doctrines and ideas, anti-missile defence, disarmament and non-proliferation.

In Germany, Alliance nuclear weapons were regarded in the past as essential for protecting national territory but, at the same time, as symbolic both of a threat to the nation’s existence in the event of east-west conflict and of its dependence on other powers – contrary to the United Kingdom or France where nuclear weapons were felt, on the whole, to be an instrument of national independence and political power in international relations. The major debate that deployment of "Euro-missiles" aroused in Germany showed that even under Soviet threat, consensus on deterrence could not be taken for granted. When the Berlin Wall fell and Germany was reunited, nuclear weapons became even more difficult to justify in the eyes of many Germans. The security agreement signed between France and Germany in December 1996 represented a step forward: the German Government stated that it was ready to "enter into a dialogue on the function of nuclear deterrence, in the context of the European defence policy" ⁽¹²⁾. The Franco-German axis was to be the basis of European defence. Germany's participation is therefore essential to it and could bring about that of other European countries. Moreover, the two countries have already established close cooperation in the field of conventional weapons and have, in the Defence Council, an institution where consultation on nuclear matters could take place on a regular basis.

Although the United Kingdom, as a nuclear power, is in quite a different position to Germany, the Anglo-French Committee held the mirror up to what Franco-German dialogue could be. At the start of any consultation, there must be a search for a consensus on the role of nuclear weapons in European security.

(vii) Are Russia’s nuclear forces deteriorating?

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia was confronted with the challenge of carving out a place for itself that allowed it to fill the void left by its predecessor and regain its position in the world.

Uncertainty as to the future role of the armed forces in a Russia no longer involved in global confrontation with a strategic adversary, combined with a substantial reduction in the defence budget, brought about a decline in the political and social status of the army, which could only lead to tension and discontent among the military. Material considerations are also tending to make the situation worse. Low wages or delays in their payment, the lack of decent housing for officers’ families returning home from abroad, particularly from Germany, notwithstanding the fact that that country financed the building of thousands of homes in Russia, were circumstances that were exploited by a variety of political forces seeking to take advantage of anger and disappointment felt within the army.

Some of the military have taken advantage of the situation to increase their influence in the political domain. Such was the case in Moldova where General Lebed, who had command of the Russian army units there, conducted policies of his own in defiance of the Government. It was also the case in Georgia, where Russian soldiers set themselves up as the defenders of Russia’s geostrategic interests.

Although it would seem that Russia’s proposals directed towards encouraging convergence between its own and European and Atlantic security and defence structures, and improving the quality of its involvement in the decision-making processes are having some success, there is still a possibility that Russia will come to feel increasingly isolated, which cannot be in anyone’s interest.

The fear of isolation and of being sidelined by European institutions, an abiding distrust of NATO and dissatisfaction with the latter’s enlargement into central Europe, together with a desire for greater recognition by the West, explains Russia’s reluctance to dismantle its nuclear arsenal.

After lengthy discussions, NATO and Russia have finally reached agreement on setting up enhanced cooperation within the framework of the Founding Act signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The fact that Kremlin leaders have just approved a massive security plan setting out Russia’s role in the 21st century is greatly to be welcomed. This represents a new military doctrine purporting that the major threat for Russia comes not from enemies beyond the country’s borders but from social and economic problems within them. The successful involvement of Russian troops in IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia, and the fact they performed well there, therefore proves that the present dilemma is one that can be resolved.

Notwithstanding these positive developments, it should be noted that the Russian armed forces are still deeply demoralised. The Chairman of the Defence Council, Mr Yuri Baturin, complaining of inadequate funding, has stated that: "if things continue as they are now for another two years, we are likely to end up with a navy without ships, an airforce without aircraft and a defence industry incapable of producing up-to-date weapons", while the former Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov, has warned against the risk of headquarters losing command of their armies: "Russia could soon reach a threshold beyond which its nuclear missiles and systems will be out of control".

The Chairman of the State Duma’s Defence Committee, Lev Rokhlin, who as a General commanded Russian troops in Chechnya during the recent conflict, has warned President Yeltsin that Russia’s nuclear forces are heading towards "extinction" because of lack of funds and maintenance. He stated that there was no money for the work to extend the life of the missiles that are on combat duty and have exhausted their guaranteed term of service, and the necessary funds were not being allocated for work on new types of weapons. Western sources have taken these warnings seriously, especially regarding a deter-ioration in vital command and control systems and in readiness and reliability ⁽¹³⁾.

Indeed, the frustrated and undisciplined Russian military undeniably represent a threat not only to their own government and their fellow countrymen, but are also a latent danger for neighbouring states and, in view of the presence of strategic weapons, a nightmare for the whole world.

The situation poses serious problems in terms of troop morale and desperation in the national defence industry, leading to a rise in crime and illegal trade, including widespread and potentially dangerous trafficking in armaments, not to mention nuclear components, which could complicate military reform and nuclear non-proliferation.

It is impossible to ascertain how many weapons are in circulation in the civilian sphere and whether they include tactical nuclear weapons. It is claimed that Russia still has some 10 000 such weapons in its possession ⁽¹⁴⁾. The former General, Alexander Lebed, accused the government of concealing the truth over the disappearance of more than 80 nuclear "mini weapons" which according to him had been unaccounted for since they were left behind in a number of former Soviet Republics ⁽¹⁵⁾. Experts have confirmed the existence of such "mini nukes", which are similar to the United States’ nuclear demolition munitions, all of which were destroyed in 1991. Thefts of material used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, such as plutonium or enriched uranium, have already been noted.

The Russian Government has repeatedly declared that it is in full control of its nuclear arsenal and this assertion has been confirmed by United States security experts. It should, however, be noted that the export of military nuclear know-how through the emigration of nuclear experts from the territory of the former Soviet Union is a long-term risk.

The potential consequences of the existence of large quantities of nuclear waste and disused nuclear submarines have also begun to arouse major concern. The case of the Northern Fleet, analysed in the Bellona report (the Bellona report on the Northern Fleet was the first document to be banned in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union) is an excellent illustration of the problem. According to the report, there are at least 21 067 cubic metres of solid radioactive waste and at least 75 423 cubic metres of radioactive effluent in naval bases, shipyards and storage installations used by the Northern Fleet. More than 24 000 fuel rods and nine reactor cores are stored in temporary deposits. Of over 130 nuclear submarines that Russia has withdrawn from service, 88 belong to the Northern Fleet and 52 of them have been decommissioned, still with their load of nuclear fuel. Most of the installations used by the Northern Fleet are allocated on the Kola peninsula, affecting an area with a population of over 100 000 inhabitants. The largest temporary storage depot of irradiated nuclear fuel is Andreeva Bay, 40 km from the Norwegian border. Here, 21 000 irradiated fuel rods, equivalent to 90 nuclear reactors, are stored in very poor conditions. Serious leaks of radioactivity were detected in the 1980s. To a very large extent, the transport and reprocessing of nuclear waste do not comply with safety regulations and the situation is aggravated by a lack of funds for maintaining existing storage and pro-cessing plants, and for building safer, more modern installations. In 1994, only 35 % of the funds allocated were actually paid over to the Northern Fleet. The amounts received were basically used to pay the salaries of and provide social assistance to Fleet staff. Over the last two years, nothing whatsoever has been done to guarantee the safety of the nuclear waste.

Until 1991, Russia practised Arctic dump-ing of its radioactive naval waste. The one train used for transporting waste to the reprocessing plant at Chelyabinsk called at the ports only three times a year. Full containers of irradiated fuel have been stored in the open for years on end and accidents have occurred. In September 1996, a memorandum of understanding on cooperation on environmental matters was signed between the United States and Russian defence ministers following accidents of this nature.

By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11, 2007 - President Bush today presented the Medal of Honor, the nation's highest decoration, to the family of Marine Cpl. Jason Dunham, who died shielding his fellow Marines from a grenade blast in Iraq in April 2004.

"With this medal, we pay tribute to the courage and leadership of a man who represents the best of young Americans," Bush said before presenting the medal to Dunham's family at the White House.

Dunham, who grew up in Scio, N.Y., was the leader of a rifle squad with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, in Iraq. Dunham's squad was conducting a reconnaissance mission in Karabilah on April 14, 2004, when a nearby convoy returning to base was ambushed. When Dunham's squad approached to assist the convoy, an Iraqi insurgent jumped out of a vehicle and grabbed Dunham by the throat. As Dunham wrestled the insurgent to the ground, he noticed that the enemy fighter had a grenade in his hand. Dunham ordered his Marines to move back, and when the enemy dropped the live grenade, Dunham took off his Kevlar helmet, covered the grenade with it, and threw himself on top to smother the blast.

Dunham initially survived his wounds, but died eight days later at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Md., with his mother and father at his bedside.

"By his selflessness, Corporal Dunham saved the lives of two of his men and showed the world what it means to be a Marine," Bush said.

Dunham is the second servicemember in the war on terror and the first Marine since the Vietnam War to receive the Medal of Honor. His mother, father, sister and two brothers were at the ceremony today, which was attended by Cabinet members, Defense Department and Marine Corps leaders, members of Congress, past Medal of Honor recipients, and members of Dunham's unit.

Bush spoke about Dunham's upbringing in upstate New York. Dunham was a star athlete who was popular and a natural leader. His father, a dairy farm worker, and his mother, a school teacher, were devoted parents. "He grew up with the riches far more important than money," Bush said.

Dunham joined the Marine Corps on July 31, 2000. It was in the Marines that he learned honor, courage, commitment and leadership qualities, Bush said. "As the leader of a rifle squad in Iraq, Corporal Dunham led by the values he had been taught," he said. "He was the guy everybody looked up to; he was a Marine's Marine who led by example."

Bush noted that Dunham's mother called the Marine Corps her son's second family. Now that family is embracing her and the rest of the Dunham family as they deal with their loss, Bush said.

Since World War II, more than half of those who have earned the Medal of Honor have lost their lives in the action that earned it, Bush said. "Corporal Jason Dunham belongs to this select group," he said. "On a dusty road in western Iraq, Corporal Dunham gave his own life so that the men under his command might live. This morning, it's my privilege to recognize Corporal Dunham's devotion to the Corps and the country and to present his family with the Medal of Honor."

Now is the time at Castle Argghhh! when we dance: In Memoriam.

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Get upset if you're too busy to talk to them for a week.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Are glad to see you after years, and will happily carry on the same conversation you were having last time you met.

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Never ask for food.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Are the reason you have no food.

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Call your parents Mr. And Mrs.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Call your parents mom and dad.

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Bail you out of jail and tell you what you did was wrong.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Would be sitting next to you saying, "Damn...we screwed up...but man that was fun!"

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Have never seen you cry.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Cry with you.

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Borrow your stuff for a few days then give it back.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Keep your stuff so long they forget it's yours.

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Know a few things about you.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Could write a book with direct quotes from you.

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Will leave you behind if that's what the crowd is doing.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Will kick the whole crowds ass that left you behind.

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Would knock on your door.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Walk right in and say, "I'm home!"

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Are for a while.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Are for life.

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Have shared a few experiences...
MILITARY FRIENDS: Have shared a lifetime of experiences no Civilian could ever dream of...

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Will take your drink away when they think you've had enough.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Will look at you stumbling all over the place and say, "You better drink the rest of that, you know we don't waste...that's alcohol abuse!!" Then carry you home safely and put you to bed...

CIVILIAN FRIENDS: Will talk crap to the person who talks crap about you.
MILITARY FRIENDS: Will knock them the hell out for using your name in vain.

On the origins of some military traditions...

...laid out for you in preparation for President Ford's funeral.

Reporting As Ordered, Sir!

You find the most interesting things...

...in the most unlikely places.

LTG Petraeus (CG here at Fort Leavenworth) was interviewed by the German Spiegel (Mirror) Online.

Spiegel asks...

LTG Petraeus' answer will be soup for Ry's soul:

This little snippet caught my attention:

Heh. While I agree, and emphatically, I sent this response to the SAMS (School of Advanced Military Studies) graduate buddy of mine, Jim C. who sent me this link...

And Jim, who is something of a warfighting intellectual himself (at least the government pays us decent dollars to do this for them... now) responded thusly:

Indeed. I agree with LTG Petraeus' responses in the piece. I only hope he (or someone like him in stature) is really working the other side - the officers who sit on the promotion boards. From our era, a not insignificant number of whom don't have combat patches. And I hope he finds a way to institutionalize it so that it lasts beyond this period of combat, though the history of the Army does not offer much hope of that.

One of the reasons I blog, beyond gun pr0n, or "the more kinetic aspects of history" as Matt describes the stuff at the Castle - to be a little ember, casting a small glow in a forgotten corner near the disused lavatory in the third sub-basement. You know the one - the one with the sign that says "Beware of the Leopard!"

Reporting As Ordered, Sir! »

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- A U.S. CH-47 Chinook helicopter went down Wednesday night in southern Afghanistan, U.S. and NATO officials said.

Preliminary reports indicate the helicopter was shot down, officials said.

Seven people -- five military crew and two military passengers -- were killed.

Additionally, NATO officials said the team that responded to the crash was ambushed. There was no immediate word on casualties during that attack.

It came amid fighting in the south between Taliban militants and NATO and Afghan forces.CH-47 Chinook helicopter reportedly shot down in country's south
• Ground troops responding to crash came under attack, NATO says
• Five crew members, two military passengers reported killed

Iskander / SS-26

The road-mobile SS-X-26 is the second attempt to replace the `Scud', since the first attempt, the Oka SS-23 SPIDER, was eliminated under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The operational requirements for the SS-26 are probably similar to those of the original SS-23. One of the major questions concerning the program is the missile's range, which is almost certainly less than the 500 km range limit established by the INF Treaty. The SS-26 may include a longer range (greater than 400 km) variant for the Russian forces, and a shorter range (less than 300 km) variant for export.

The TEL was likely based on the new BAZ-6909 family of trucks, first publicly displayed at a commercial transport show in Moscow in August 1995. Two missiles are carried on each launcher, though the delay between firing each round is unclear. The new TEL is apparently based on the the 9P71 Oka TEL, though the new SS- X-26 TEL has been designed with the INF Treaty in mind, with several external changes that clearly differentiate the two vehicles to prevent treaty compliance problems. The nose of the vehicle has been extended forward, the chassis lengthened, and the access door arrangement has been changes. The tactical parameters of the two vehicles are probably similar.

In 1996 Russian television reports depicted the first launch of the SS-X-26, which is a direct evolution of the SS-23 Oka. It appears probable that new features will be incorporated into the design. The SS-X-26 appears to have several different conventional warheads, including a cluster munitions warhead, a fuel-air explosive enhanced-blast warhead, a tactical earth penetrator for bunker busting and an electro- magnetic pulse device for anti-radar missions. Given the relatively small warhead, improved terminal precision was a major system requirement, which could be achieved by active terminal sensor such as millimeter wave radar, satellite terminal guidance using GLOSNASS, an improved inertial platform, or some combination of these approaches.

As of 1999 it appeared that this system had entered operational service with the Russian Army.

The launch installation has two missiles with a range of 280 kilometers. Each missile has a 480 kilogram warhead consisting of 54 elements. The system can be used against small and large targets. The Iskander missile can easily overcome air defense systems. It's almost impossible to prevent a launch of an Iskander missile because of the system's mobility. Targets can be found not only by satellite and aircraft but also by a conventional intelligence center and by a soldier who directs artillery fire. Targets can also be found from photos, which will be put into a computer by means of a scanner. The self-direction device functions even in fog or darkness. Only the Iskander system can accomplish such tasks. The United States has tried to reconsider the missile technology control regime and here arises the question whether this may be an obstacle for the sale of the new missile abroad. Such missile systems as Iskander have a special place in the world weapons market. Even a small amount of such missiles drastically changes the balance of force in conflicts.

According to Nikolay Guschin, chief and senior designer of the Machinebuilding Design Office, the complex is meant ' for covertly preparing and launching effective missile strikes at small-size targets of particular importance. A specificity of this complex is the high level of automation in the pre-launch preparations little time required to make it ready, and the high precision of shooting.

Research carried out by specialists from the leading Russian military science centers has shown that the lskander-E missile complex is 5 to 8 times better than its foreign analogues in terms of the "effectiveness-cost" criterion. As for its tactical and technical characteristics, it also poses a great improvement on the existing Russian tactical missile complexes. Capable of accomplishing tasks connected with the use of non-nuclear warheads, it's the world's first complex equipped with two-missile launch installation. Weighing 3800 kilos each, controlled throughout the trajectory of their flight, equipped with various systems of correction and self-targeting, its missiles are capable of overcoming the enemy's anti-missile defences and hitting targets at a distance of 280 kilometers.

According to military experts, the lskander-E missile complex will serve as "determent weapon" in local conflicts and as strategic arms for the countries with limited territory. Its great range of shooting making it possible to use it from the depth of one's own positions, and the brief time it can stay in its launch position make the complex virtually invulnerable to ordinary weapons.

The composition of the complex makes it possible to ensure the full cycle of its use in combat, including its combat control, information base, technical servicing and the training of its crews, without the involvement of additional remedies.

Russia: Missile Test Heightens Arms Race Fears

By Luke Allnutt

May 30, 2007 (RFE/RL) -- Russia has tested new strategic and tactical missiles at a time when tensions with the United States remain high over Washington's plans to locate parts of a missile-defense system in Central Europe.

First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) it fired could penetrate any missile-defense system.

The new RS-24 ICBM blasted off from a mobile launcher in northwestern Russia on May 29.

It landed -- on target, according to the Strategic Missile Forces -- 5,500 kilometers away on Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia's Far East.

Not very much is known about the missile's development. A statement from the military said the new missile will eventually replace RS-18 and RS-20 missiles, which are staples in Russia's aging missile arsenal.

Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said it was a new version of the Topol-M ICBM, which have a range of around 10,000 kilometers.

Other news reports said the missile was equipped with MIRV capabilities, which means the missile carries a number of independently targetable warheads.

However, a spokesperson for the Jane's Information Group said that Russia has said it is a new "designation" of missile, but it isn't yet clear whether it's a new missile or an adapted older missile.

Modernizing Military

Russia is modernizing its military. In November last year, Putin earmarked $200 billion for a 10-year modernization program. On May 29, Ivanov also announced that the military had tested an improved tactical cruise missile.

While the technical specifications of the new ICBM may still be unclear, Russia's message to the West is not.

Ivanov, who is considered by many to be a potential successor to President Vladimir Putin, said on May 29 that the new missiles are "able to overcome any existing and future missile defense shields."

Ivanov's comments were a reference to a proposed U.S. plan to deploy parts of a missile-defense system in Central Europe.

Moscow has criticized the plan, saying it is directed against Russia. President Putin, speaking on May 29 at a news conference with Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates in Moscow, warned against turning Europe into a "powder keg."

"I will say it again: this creates new, unnecessary risks for the entire system of international relations in the world and in Europe," Putin said.

The United States has denied allegations that the missile-defense system is directed against Russia. Washington has said that the shield is intended to defend against threats from "rogue states."

Arms Race Fears

There are fears that recent defense moves by both the United States and Russia could trigger a new arms race in Europe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin last month said Moscow will suspend compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty because NATO members Slovenia and the Baltic states have not signed it, while other NATO signatories have not ratified it and are not abiding by its provisions.

And on May 29, Ivanov said that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) is not effective. He said "dozens of countries" bordering Russia have acquired such missiles, which the treaty restricts.

Yury Fedorov, an expert in Russia's foreign and security policy, at the London-based Chatham House, says a new arms race is possible.

"Unfortunately, if Russia really withdrew from the INF treaty, it may ignite a new so-called missile crisis that would be similar to the missile crisis in Europe in the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s of the last century," Fedorov says. "[The missile tests are] a gesture that should demonstrate that Russia is moving from words to deeds in its relations with the West."

With parliamentary elections at the end of this year and a presidential vote in March 2008, Fedorov also says it is likely to be a gesture not just aimed at the West, but aimed at the Russian people.

RIM-161 SM-3 (AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense)

Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) is being developed as part of the US Navy’s sea-based ballistic missile defense system and will provide theater-wide defense against medium and long range ballistic missiles. In 1992, the Terrier LEAP (Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile) demonstration program culminated in four flight tests and demonstrated the feasibility of theater-wide ballistic missile defense. This program evolved into today’s SM-3 development program which is based on the SM-2 Block IV airframe and propulsion stack, but incorporates a Third Stage Rocket Motor, a GPS/INS Guidance Section and the SM-3 Kinetic Warhead.

The United States Navy and the Missile Defense Agency are developing Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) as part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System that will provide allied forces and U.S. protection from short to intermediate range ballistic missiles. The SM-3 Kinetic Warhead (KW) is designed to intercept an incoming ballistic missile outside the earth’s atmosphere. SM-3 is under development by Raytheon at its Missile Systems business unit in Tucson, Arizona.

Configuration

The Aegis BMDS builds upon the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization/Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (SDIO/ BMDO) investment in Lightweight ExoAtmospheric Projectile (LEAP) technology and the Navy’s Aegis weapon system including Standard Missile and MK41 Vertical Launching System currently deployed on many U.S. Navy and international surface combatants.

The SM-3 KW is a highly modular, compact, space tested kinetic warhead designed to defend against short to intermediate range ballistic missile attacks. Raytheon has engineered two prior generations of LEAP designs starting in 1985 under contracts with SDIO and BMDO. This third generation LEAP design integrates the teamed experience of Raytheon and Boeing in KW designs and Alliant Techsystems’ expertise in Solid Divert and Attitude Control. The SM-3 KW design features a large aperture wide field of view long wave infrared seeker that provides acquisition ranges greater than 300 km against typical ballistic missile threats. Seeker pointing and intercept guidance are supported by a production IFOG Inertial Measurement Unit and wooden round simplicity of the SDACS propulsion providing over 2 miles of terminal divert capability. The KW includes a fully encrypted data downlink capability for full engineering evaluation of KW performance and to support rapid kill assessment.

The SM-3 evolves from the proven SM-2 Block IV design. SM-3 uses the same booster and dual thrust rocket motor as the Block IV missile for the first and second stages and the same steering control section and midcourse missile guidance for maneuvering in the atmosphere. To support the extended range of an exo-atmospheric intercept, additional missile thrust is provided in a new third stage for the SM-3 missile, containing a dual pulse rocket motor for the early exo-atmospheric phase of flight and a Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Kinetic Warhead (KW) for the intercept phase. Upon second stage separation, the first pulse burn of the Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM) provides the axial thrust to maintain the missile’s trajectory into the exo-atmosphere. Upon entering the exo-atmosphere, the third stage coasts. The TSRM’s attitude control system maneuvers the third stage to eject the nosecone, exposing the KW’s Infrared (IR) seeker. If the third stage requires a course correction for an intercept, the rocket motor begins the second pulse burn. Upon completion of the second pulse burn, the IR seeker is calibrated and the KW ejects. The KW possesses its own attitude control system and guidance commands are acted upon by a solid divert propulsion system. The IR seeker acquires the target. Tracking information is continuously transmitted to the guidance assembly which controls the divert propulsion system.

Discrimination algorithms enable defense systems to compare objects in a target scene to determine which to intercept. Increasingly complex threats with separated target elements, countermeasures, and debris, require advanced signal processing and discrimination algorithms to identify object features needed to provide robust target selection. SM-3 has flown and demonstrated fundamental discrimination capability for unitary threats.

Computer program design upgrades are in work to expand the current selection accuracy and add capability against more stressing unitary and separating target scenes using target features observed by the Aegis radar system and the KW LWIR seeker to optimize selection confidence. Leveraging off discrimination architecture used across Raytheon’s missile programs, SM-3 continues to evolve an integrated discrimination design for insertion with the current seeker design and each of the sensing and signal processor upgrades available to counter advancing threats.

Raytheon is working closely with the Navy to ensure that SM-3, based on legacy Standard tactical missile designs, stands ready to provide immediate emergency Aegis BMD capability against preponderant threats. The SM-3 Block I KW configuration features a single color LWIR seeker, a solid DACS propulsion, target identification and discrimination, and lethal intercept accuracy.

In 2004 the Pentagon decided to embark on the development in fiscal 2007 of an enhanced version of the Standard Missile 3 interceptor.

Flight Test Program

The Aegis BMD flight test program has achieved four successful intercepts in five attempts. These flight tests have demonstrated the capability to intercept short-range, simple unitary targets in both descent and ascent phases of flight, and in the case of FM-6, have shown the capability to destroy the target warhead.

The AEGIS LEAP Intercept (ALI) program has demonstrated the design capabilities of the SM-3 KW with a series of ground and flight tests. ALI culminated in two successful ballistic missile intercepts on the first two engagement missions. Flight Mission Two (FM-2) flown on 25 January 2002 and Flight Mission Three (FM-3) on 13 June 2002 were completely successful allowing the program to proceed into testbed development.

Aegis BMD testbed initiated a series of increasingly complex missions to evaluate SM-3 design capability while the program prepares for potential emergency tactical availability. The first mission of this test series, Flight Mission Four (FM-4), was flown on 21 November 2002 resulting in a third successful intercept for the program. This mission demonstrated the ship’s crew and system response times necessary to track, engage, and intercept a ballistic missile target early in flight during its ascent phase (prior to apogee). FM-4 also provided a key verification of SM-3’s capability to accurately hit the target at a predefined point for lethality which, for this test, was forward of the target center. The KW impacted within centimeters of the aimpoint, completely destroying the target avionics section.

In FY03, two intercept attempts of a unitary target in its ascent phase were conducted. In the first test, the Aegis BMD element successfully intercepted the target. Using a newly designed divert system onboard the SM-3 missile, the Aegis BMD failed to intercept the target in the second FY03 test. The cause of the failed intercept has been attributed to a malfunction in a divert valve in the attitude control system onboard the kinetic warhead. Testing continued based on the consistent performance of the sustained pulse mode, while mitigation options were evaluated.

In FY03, the operational robustness of the Aegis BMD Block 2004 test program was enhanced by increased operational realism in the test strategy. Efforts to add operational realism as part of the developmental test strategy provide significant risk reduction in advance of operational testing and potential deployment of the element. The planned growth in flight test realism is consistent with the maturity of the system. Although the Block 2004 flight test plan include many operationally realistic aspects, some important operational scenarios remain untested by the end of the Block 2004 test program. These include multiple simultaneous engagements and separating targets. Development and integration of critical technologies pertaining to threat discrimination (e.g., AWS discrimination logic, radar and infrared seeker upgrades) and missile propulsion (e.g., kinetic warhead divert system, SM-3 booster propulsion) could improve operational capability as they are introduced in Block 2004 and subsequent upgrades.

On 18 June 2003. A developmental Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) is launched from the U.S. Navy cruiser, USS Lake Erie (CG-70), in a Missile Defense Agency test, Wednesday, near Kauai, Hawaii. The test was the latest in a series aimed at developing a sea-based defense against short to medium range ballistic missile threats.

On 11 December 2003 Flight Mission-6 (FM-6) involved the detection and tracking of an Aries medium-range target missile launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), Kauai, Hawaii at 8:10am HST (1:10pm EST). Approximately two minutes after target launch, a developmental Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) was launched from the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense cruiser the USS LAKE ERIE (CG 70). Approximately two minutes later the SM-3 successfully intercepted the target missile with Òhit to killÓ technology, using only the force of the direct collision to destroy the target. This was the fourth successful intercept for Aegis BMD and SM-3.

Raytheon's next hit-to-kill success with the sea-based STANDARD Missile-3 occurred on 11 December 2003. Between January 2002 and late 2004, the Aegis BMD system had successfully intercepted targets in space four times with SM-3. In all the flight tests, the SM-3 was launched from a US Navy cruiser under increasingly realistic, operational conditions.

On 24 February 2005 the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Weapon System and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) destroyed a ballistic missile outside the earth's atmosphere during an Aegis BMD Program flight test over the Pacific Ocean. The Feb. 24 mission -- the fifth successful intercept for SM-3 -- was the first firing of the Aegis BMD "Emergency Deployment" capability using operational versions of the SM-3 Block I missile and Aegis BMD Weapon System. This was also the first test to exercise SM-3's third stage rocket motor (TSRM) single-pulse mode. The TSRM has two pulses, which can be ignited independently, providing expansion of the ballistic missile engagement battlespace. The SM-3 was launched from the Aegis BMD cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and hit a target missile that had been launched from the U.S. Navy's Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai, Hawaii.

On 17 November 2005 a test involved for the first time a "separating" target, meaning that the target warhead separated from its booster rocket requiring the interceptor to distinguish between the body of the missile and the actual warhead. The interceptor missile was launched from the Pearl Harbor-based Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70). The target was intercepted more than 100 miles in space above the Pacific Ocean and 375 miles northwest of Kauai.

A Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) was launched on March 8, 2006 from the USS Lake Erie (CG 70) in a Missile Defense Agency and Japan Defense Agency joint test in the Pacific. The cooperative test demonstrated the SM-3 with a Japan-designed advanced nosecone. The flight test, a milestone in a joint cooperative research project, is an example of the ongoing coordination between the U.S. and Japan on missile defense efforts.

Deployment

To fulfill the sea-based portion of the initial missile defense capabilities, the MDA is developing Aegis BMD in close coordination with the Navy and Naval Sea Systems Command. Aegis BMD Block 2004 consists of two major contributions to BMDS. The first contribution is Aegis DDG-51 Class Destroyers equipped for Long Range Surveillance and Track (LRS&T). LRS&T provides a capability to detect and track LRBMs and to report the track data to the BMDS. This capability assists in the sharing of tracking data to cue other BMDS sensors and provides fire control support to engagement elements. LRS&T is the first Aegis BMD delivery and is part of the Initial Defensive Operations (IDO), which went on alert in 2004.

The second contribution is Aegis CG-47 Class Cruisers equipped with the LRS&T capability, but also armed with the new SM-3, capable of intercepting short and medium range ballistic missile threats in the midcourse phase of flight. By 2005, full Aegis BMD Block 2004 functionality will be implemented in the first set of Aegis Cruisers. In the future, Aegis BMD capability will evolve to defeat longer range ballistic missiles.

Raytheon delivered five SM-3 operational rounds to the Missile Defense Agency in 2004. The program is transitioning to production, with Kinetic Warhead seeker and final integration occurring in Raytheon's state-of-the-art Kill Vehicle manufacturing facility, alongside the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. Final assembly and test occur in Camden, AK. As part of the initial deployment of the BMDS, five Pacific Fleet Aegis Destroyers had operational LRS&T upgrades installed by the end of 2004. There will be a total of 15 LRS&T Aegis Destroyers and 3 Aegis BMD engagement Cruisers by the end of CY 06.

In October 2004 Raytheon Company began delivering STANDARD Missile-3 (SM-3) initial deployment rounds to the Missile Defense Agency. SM-3 is a key element of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and builds on the existing fleet of Aegis cruisers and destroyers. This is a critical milestone for Raytheon and for the country. These deployment rounds move the US Navy one step closer to providing a sea-based defense against short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile threats. The delivery of SM-3 supports the administration's commitment to provide a sea-based missile defense capability.

Aegis BMD went to sea on 30 September 2004, able to track an ICBM and to communicate that information to the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The Navy added firepower to Aegis BMD with the SM-3 missile. It is able to participate in the defense of not only the US, but of allies, friends and deployed troops against short-medium range ballistic missiles around the globe. Because naval forces are inherently mobile and capable of multiple missions, Aegis BMD will provide a broad array of options to operational commanders responding to a wide variety of dynamic world situations.

Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Deployment

The potential for allied cooperation in development and procurement of a BMD system is real. In December 2003, through a formal Cabinet Decision, the Government of Japan became the first ally to decide to proceed with the acquisition of a multi-layered BMD system, basing its initial capability on upgrades of its Aegis Destroyers and acquisition of the SM-3 missile. The two nations began the research program in 1999 for a system to launch interceptors from Aegis destroyers. Japan has spent 15.6 billion yen up to fiscal 2003. The AEGIS Weapon System and Standard missiles will be used on JMSDF ships and will provide, in concert with JSDF PAC-3 Patriot missiles, the initial ballistic missile defense for mainland Japan. Japan already has the upgraded AEGIS Weapon System and SM-3 Block IA Standard missiles in its inventory and will have no difficulty absorbing the additional upgraded Weapon System and missiles.

The first Aegis BMD installation in the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force was scheduled for the fall of 2007. In addition, Japan will upgrade their Patriot units with PAC-3 missiles and improved ground support equipment. The US has worked closely with Japan since 1999 to design and develop advanced components for the SM-3 missile. This project would culminate in flight tests of SM-3 variant missiles in 2005 and 2006.

On 5 May 2004, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Japan of SM-3 Block 1A Standard Missiles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $725 million.

On 29 June 2005, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Japan of nine SM-3 Block IA Standard missiles with MK 21 Mod 2 canisters, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $387 million. The Government of Japan has requested a possible sale of nine SM-3 Block IA Standard missiles with MK 21 Mod 2 canisters, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) upgrades to one AEGIS Weapon System, AEGIS BMD Vertical Launch System ORDALTs, containers, spare and repair parts, publications, documentation, supply support, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $387 million.

TEHRAN, Iran (Reuters) -- Iran will not suspend uranium enrichment, the key U.N. demand in a nuclear row with Tehran, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani said the day before talks with the EU's Javier Solana.

"Suspension is not a solution to Iran's nuclear issue ... Iran cannot accept suspension," Larijani told reporters at a Tehran airport before his departure.

"We have no conditions, and we are ready for constructive talks, but we will not accept any preconditions. We are ready to remove concerns over Iran's atomic issue."

Larijani meets Solana, the EU foreign policy chief leading discussions on behalf of world powers, on Thursday in Madrid.

Previous meetings have failed to persuade Tehran to obey U.N. resolutions demanding that it halt enrichment, a process which the West believes Iran is seeking to master so that it can build atomic bombs. Tehran denies the charge.

The U.N. Security Council has imposed two sets of sanctions on Iran since December for its failure to heed U.N. demands. The United States, which has led efforts to isolate Iran, has threatened further steps.

Iran insists its program is aimed at generating electricity. Iran's first nuclear power plant is still being built.

Iran temporarily suspended enrichment under a previous deal with the European Union but that pact collapsed in 2005 and Tehran resumed the work.

Solana is empowered by the world's major powers -- the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany as well as the EU -- to explore the scope for formal negotiations on a package of economic, technological and political initiatives if Iran suspends enrichment.

May 28 airpower summary: Airlift reduces need for convoys

5/29/2007 - SOUTHWEST ASIA (AFPN) -- Coalition airpower supported coalition ground forces in Iraq and International Security Assistance Force troops in Afghanistan during operations May 28, according to Combined Air and Space Operations Center officials here.

In Afghanistan, a Royal Air Force GR-9 Harrier fired rockets at enemy personnel moving toward coalition forces near Garmsir. The pilots dropped an enhanced Paveway II munition on an insurgent hideout as well. The Harrier also dropped a 540-pound bomb on an enemy trench system in the area. All of the strikes were reported as successful by an on-scene joint terminal attack controller.

JTACs are highly trained U.S. Air Force and coalition personnel who advise ground commanders on appropriate air power support, relay the ground commander's intent to air power assets overhead, and communicate with aircrews for precision engagement.

Also in Garmsir, French M-2000 Mirages dropped guided bomb unit-12s on enemy targets and escorted a coalition convoy. Other Mirages provided a show of force with multiple flares in the area. The drops and shows of force were reported as successful.

Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles provided shows of force, releasing flares to help ground forces withdraw from an area in Gardez. The F-15Es stayed with the ground forces until they had reached a forward operating base. They experienced no attacks while the aircraft were escorting them.

An Air Force B-1B Lancer executed shows of force, releasing flares to support a medical evacuation in Asadabad. There were no attacks reported after the show of force. The Lancer also conducted a show of presence for a convoy on a coalition route in the area.

Another B-1 showed force with flares to break up a developing riot in Farah. The show of force was called successful. They also performed shows of presence over a highway in the area.

An Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II provided a show of force, launching flares over Orgun-E to deter enemy activity surrounding a convoy in the area. There were no reports of attacks after the show of force. The pilots stayed with the convoy until they reached their final location.

An F-15E provided a show of force over Kandahar to prevent any enemy activity while a convoy was stopped for vehicle repair.

In total, 41 close-air-support missions were flown in support of ISAF and Afghan security forces, reconstruction activities and route patrols.

Ten Air Force intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft flew missions in support of operations in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, a U.S. Marine F-18 Hornet fired multiple cannon rounds at a vehicle with mortar capabilities near Karamah. The strafing was reported successful.

RAF GR-4 Tornados watched over coalition forces convoys struck by improvised explosive devices and small-arms fire near Taji and Baquba.

Also in Baquba, Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons dropped GBU-38s on a factory suspected of making suicide bombs. The bombs destroyed the building. F-16 pilots watched over a raid and looked for IEDs in the same area. Other F-16s supported ground units taking small-arms fire. The pilots monitored the insurgents who fled after firing on the ground forces.

Later in Baquba, F-16s began searching for a downed helicopter. A-10s picked up the search and provided overwatch of the crash site. U.S. Navy F-18 Super Hornets monitored the area as well. Air Force MQ-1Predators also monitored the crash scene.

An F-16 conducted a show of force, releasing flares over a convoy that had taken fire. The JTAC who requested the show of force witnessed the insurgents fleeing after the F-16 passed over.

In Salman Pak, an F-16 performed a show of force, firing flares for coalition forces taking small-arms fire. The JTAC in the area reported the show of force was successful.

In total, coalition aircraft flew 62 close-air-support missions for Operation Iraqi Freedom. These missions supported coalition ground forces, protected key infrastructure, provided overwatch for reconstruction activities and helped to deter and disrupt terrorist activities.

Nineteen Air Force, Navy and Royal Australian Air Force ISR aircraft flew missions in support of operations in Iraq. Additionally, seven Air Force, Navy and RAF fighter aircraft performed tactical reconnaissance.

Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft and C-17 Globemaster IIIs provided intratheater heavy airlift support, helping to sustain operations throughout Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa. Approximately 139 airlift sorties were flown; 820 tons of cargo was delivered, and approximately 2,280 passengers were transported. This included approximately 54,325 pounds of troop re-supply air-dropped in Afghanistan.

Coalition C-130 crews from Australia flew in support of operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. 

On May 27, Air Force, RAF and French aerial refueling crews flew 44 sorties and off-loaded approximately 2.9 million pounds of fuel to 212 receiving aircraft.

LOCKHEED MARTIN SUCCESSFULLY DEMONSTRATES HIGH ALTITUDE LAUNCH CAPABILITY FOR MK-54 TORPEDOES

ORLANDO, FLORIDA, May 29, 2007 --

Lockheed Martin [NYSE: LMT] successfully demonstrated its High Altitude ASW Weapons Concept (HAAWC) from a P-3 aircraft recently.

HAAWC employs the Lockheed Martin LongShot® Wing Adapter Kit to allow the launch of torpedoes from high altitudes and long standoff ranges, allowing P-3 aircrews to remain beyond the reach of enemy air defenses. Additionally, the maneuverability of the concept allows for off-axis launch of torpedoes at potential undersea targets preventing the need for the aircraft to maneuver.

In this single point concept demonstration, conducted at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) in the Bahamas, the MK-54 torpedo was launched from the internal weapons bay of the P-3 aircraft flying above 8,000 feet. After executing a turn at a pre-determined way point, the HAAWC-equipped torpedo navigated via GPS to its normal launch altitude close to the surface. Once at the desired release point, the LongShot wings self-jettisoned, allowing water entry of the Mk-54. The test torpedo was a fully functional MK-54 exercise torpedo, with an exercise section replacing the warhead.

“The significance of this capability to the Navy is that it will enable the crew to launch from high altitudes, enhancing the survivability of both the aircrew and aircraft by providing safe standoff,” said Alan Jackson, director of the HAAWC program at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. “Without HAAWC, P-3s must descend to a low altitude to deliver the torpedo. The HAAWC concept improves the delivery accuracy and shortens the engagement time of the MK-54.”

In addition, HAAWC will reduce stress on the Maritime Patrol aircraft by allowing it to stay at altitude to launch HAAWC-equipped torpedoes. This will assist in reducing fatigue on those aircraft currently in U.S. Navy service as well as future Navy aircraft.

The U.S. Navy awarded Lockheed Martin the $3 million HAAWC contract in June 2006. The successful test leads to a U.S. Navy decision on proceeding with System Design and Development of the HAAWC system.

The LongShot is a low-cost, self-contained wing adaptor kit that provides range extension and autonomous guidance to a family of existing air-to-surface munitions, including sea mines, gravity bombs, laser-guided bombs and tactical munitions dispensers. No aircraft modification is required to deploy a LongShot equipped munition. The system is completely self-contained, including a flight control computer, a GPS-based navigation system and power sources and does not require an electrical interface with the aircraft.

Headquartered in Bethesda, Md., Lockheed Martin employs about 140,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services.

Raytheon Demonstrates Joint C3I Warfighter Interoperability

TEWKSBURY, Mass., May 29, 2007 /PRNewswire/ -- Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) further demonstrated its leading edge Joint Battlefield Integration capability earlier this month with a real-time hardware in-the-loop demonstration of Joint Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (Joint C3I).

The Joint C3I demonstration pushed required battlefield situational awareness to a new level by using existing and future communications infrastructures to enable real-time warfighter response at both strategic and tactical command levels. Using Raytheon's Joint Fires (JFires) tool, which brings its own unique warfighting capability, commanders will now be able to view a single integrated picture by integrating tactical command and control with intelligence systems using satellite communications links. Open architecture and net-enabled products were key contributors bringing this capability forward.

"The challenge is to provide accurate, fused, real-time information from multiple sources that enable both theater and field commanders to respond in a timely and effective manner," said Dan Smith, president, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems (IDS). "With threats around the globe -- from terror to tactical -- that require widely distributed response assets, Raytheon's Joint C3I capability provides a rapid and affordable capability that integrates and connects the 'now' global intel community with the warfighter."

The backbone technology that enables this capability is Raytheon's TCN(R) (Tactical Component Network) software. Systems integrated for the demonstration included the U.S. Navy's Zumwalt Total Ship Computing Environment, Raytheon's JFires sensor networking environment, a satellite communications link, the U.S. Air Force's Distributed Common Ground System, and Deep Siren, a submarine tactical paging system. Raytheon officials conducting the demonstration said that other sensor systems will also be integrated into Joint C3I.

Global connectivity is achieved using advanced extremely high frequency satellite communications with bandwidth to support video streaming, still images and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data among geographically dispersed terminals.

"The critical enablers for this successful demonstration were an understanding of the warfighter's needs and a commitment to field open architecture and netted products that can be quickly and efficiently integrated," said Bill Kiczuk, technical director for Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems. "Joint C3I has shown that the tools to affect the integration are designed into our systems today and are ready to exploit more advanced capabilities as they are fielded."

Raytheon IDS, collaborating with Raytheon Network Centric Systems and Intelligence and Information Systems, led the integration of government and industry Joint C3I systems.

Integrated Defense Systems is Raytheon's leader in Joint Battlespace Integration providing affordable, integrated solutions to a broad international and domestic customer base, including the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. Armed Forces and the Department of Homeland Security.

Raytheon Company, with 2006 sales of $20.3 billion, is a technology leader specializing in defense, homeland security and other government markets throughout the world. With a history of innovation spanning 85 years, Raytheon provides state-of-the-art electronics, mission systems integration and other capabilities in the areas of sensing; effects; and command, control, communications and intelligence systems, as well as a broad range of mission support services. With headquarters in Waltham, Mass., Raytheon employs 73,000 people worldwide.

Changes on horizon for Air Force pilots

by Staff Sgt. Monique Randolph
Secretary of the Air Force Office of Public Affairs

5/29/2007 - WASHINGTON (AFPN) -- The Air Force recently announced there are changes forthcoming in aircrew management.

A new process called Transformational Aircrew Management Initiatives for the 21st Century, or TAMI-21, is intended to account for force structure changes that have caused imbalances in pilot inventory distribution and set the table for what the Air Force pilot force will look like in the future.

The initiatives will ensure pilots receive training in certain rated positions to bring the structure of the pilot force more in line with Air Force priorities.

"The advance capabilities of our 5th generation fighter aircraft has allowed the Air Force to significantly cut the number of aircraft we need," said Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley. "We have reduced the number of fighter aircraft in our inventory by 152 since 2001, while increasing the number of UAS platforms by 113 and AFSOC platforms by 25 over the next several years.

"The decrease in fighter and bomber cockpits, combined with the increased need for Special Operations and UAS capabilities, demands a redistribution of our pilot force," he said.

In order to accomplish this redistribution, the chief of staff recently approved the six initiatives of TAMI-21, which include: 

-- Eliminating combat air forces operations unit overmanning

-- Opening up previously restricted airframes to new specialized undergraduate training graduates 

-- Placing career enlisted aviators in non-flying rated requirements 

-- Using the Total Force to help absorb new pilots and provide staff expertise 

-- Increasing the minimum number of sorties required per month for inexperienced pilots 

-- Ensuring aircrew training requirements meet combatant commander needs

"Our aircrew management system has not changed dramatically since 1999," said Lt. Gen. Howie Chandler, Air Force deputy chief of staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements. "We must re-balance our aircrew system to meet the updated demands brought about by post-9/11 missions and several force structure changes while making the most of our new airborne systems."

With the growing importance of unmanned aerial systems and Air Force special operations, the Air Force is realigning some of its assets to provide capable, proven pilots to these increasingly critical programs.

As a result of TAMI-21, the Air Force will allow fighter and bomber pilots with limited experience to volunteer for long-term reassignment to special operations and UAS mission areas.

"Redistributing some of our outstanding young pilots to new weapons system which demand their aggressive mindset will ensure the success of these growing mission areas," General Chandler said. "At the same time, the operational units they leave behind will see an immediate increase in sorties per pilot, equating to increased combat capability across the combat air forces."

Beginning in 2008, SUPT graduates will be eligible for assignment to the F-22, and from now on, all manned platforms will be programmed to accept SUPT graduates as part of initial operational capability, to include F-35, CSAR-X, KC-X and all future systems.

"The stakes are too high and resources too scarce to have anything other than an optimally tuned force of Airmen," said Lt. Gen. Roger Brady, deputy chief of staff of Air Force Manpower and Personnel. "The six TAMI-21 initiatives ensure that we get the most trained capability for the Air Force's rated force investment dollar."

The third initiative will allow the Air Force to convert several hundred rated officer positions to CEA positions. Placing CEAs in non-flying positions that require operational expertise will leverage the vast pool of experience found among enlisted aviators and provide them greater responsibility and professional growth opportunities.

Additionally, as the Air Force moves toward a more integrated Total Force, some active-duty pilots are already assigned to Guard and Reserve units, lending their Air Reserve Component expertise in seasoning new pilots on active duty as well as potentially filling some active-duty staff positions requiring rated experience.

"The Air Force has many exciting rated career opportunities for aggressive and forward-thinking officers," General Brady said. "The rapid growth of AFSOC and UAS would make these two high-return options very attractive if I were a young lieutenant or captain today.

"More than ever, I believe our rated force has come to understand that we are in the business of using Airpower to create effects in the battlespace," he said. "The UAS is a great capability to do that and there are great opportunities for our aviators in this exciting new mission area."

The Navy will christen the newest Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer, Truxtun, Saturday, June 2, 2007, during a 10 a.m. CDT ceremony at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Pascagoula, Miss.

Designated hull number DDG 103, the new destroyer honors Commodore Thomas Truxtun (1755-1822) who embarked upon a seafaring career at age 12. When the U.S. Navy was organized, he was selected as one of its first six captains on June 4, 1798. He was assigned command of the USS Constellation, one of the new frigates, and he put to sea to prosecute the undeclared naval war with revolutionary France. On Feb. 9, 1799, Truxtun scored the first of his two most famous victories. After an hour's fight, Constellation battered the French warship L’Insurgente into submission in one of the most illustrious battles of the quasi-war with France. Truxtun retired from the Navy as a commodore and has had five previous ships carry his name: a brig launched in 1842, a destroyer with the hull number DD 14, a destroyer with the hull number DD 229, a high speed transport with the hull number APD 98 (initially designated a destroyer escort with the hull number DE 282), and a nuclear-powered frigate (DLGN) later re-designated a cruiser with the hull number CGN 35.

Rep. Gene Taylor of Mississippi will deliver the ceremony's principal address. Carol Leigh Roelker and Susan Scott Martin, descendants of the ship’s namesake, will serve as sponsors of the ship. In accordance with Navy tradition, they will break a bottle of champagne across the ship’s bow and christen the ship in the name of Truxtun.

Truxtun is the 53rd of 62 Arleigh Burke class destroyers. This multi-mission ship can conduct a variety of operations, from peacetime presence and crisis management to sea control and power projection, in support of the National Military Strategy. Truxtun will be capable of fighting air, surface, and subsurface battles simultaneously and contains a myriad of offensive and defensive weapons designed to support maritime defense needs well into the 21st century.

Cdr. Timothy R. Weber, a native of Decatur, Ga., will become the first commanding officer of the ship and will lead the crew of 276 officers and enlisted personnel. The 9,200-ton Truxtun is being built by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Ingalls Operations, Pascagoula, Miss. The ship is 510 feet in length, has a waterline beam of 59 feet, and a navigational draft of 31 feet. Four gas turbine engines will power the ship to speeds in excess of 30 knots.

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Southwest Airport Services, Houston, Texas,* is being awarded a maximum $51,817,243.45 fixed price with economic price adjustment contract for jet fuel. Using services are Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Other locations of performance are KEFD, Ellington Field. There were 2 proposals solicited with 3 responses. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. Date of performance completion is March 31, 2011. Contracting activity is Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), Ft. Belvoir, Va. (SP0600-07-D-0081).

NAVY

L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, Waco, Texas, is being awarded a $42,202,914 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the development of a Next Generation Range Support Aircraft (NGRSA). Efforts include the modification/upgrade of the P-3 aircraft, including designing, developing, documenting, installing, integrating, and testing to verify the integration of the aircraft modifications and range instrumentation. Work will be performed in Waco, Texas, and is expected to be completed in April 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $1,500,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured via a request for proposals; six firms were solicited and two offers were received. The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, Calif., is the contracting activity (N68936-07-C-0047).

M. A. Mortenson Company, Minneapolis, Minn., was awarded$19,006,622 on May 25, 2007, for Task Order JM01 Modification 06 under previously awarded indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity multiple award construction contract (N62472-01-D-0077) for the design and construction of a hangar and aircraft parking apron at Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville to accommodate aircraft and personnel being relocated from NAS Brunswick, Maine. The work will be performed in Jacksonville, Fla., and is expected to be completed by April 2009. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southeast, Jacksonville, Fla., is the contracting activity.

Joseph J. Henderson & Son, Inc., Gurnee, Ill., was awarded a $16,061,800 firm-fixed price contract on May 25, 2007, for the design and construction of a Federal health care facility parking and infrastructure project at the North Chicago Veteran Affairs Medical Center. The work includes construction of a 4-story parking garage, a gatehouse and entry gates, utility relocations, a new site entry intersection on Green Bay Road with a traffic light, a south parking area, a retention pond and other related site work. Work will be performed in North Chicago, Ill., and is expected to be completed by June 2008. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively negotiated via the Naval Facilities Engineering Command e-solicitation website with three proposals received. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Midwest, Great Lakes, Ill., is the contracting activity (N40083-07-C-0006).

Health Study Uses Data from Global War on Terrorism

By Gerry J. Gilmore
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 29, 2007 – When a landmark Defense Department-sponsored health study was launched six years ago, one of its goals was to evaluate the impact of future deployments on long-term health. The investigators did not know how timely the project would be.

Today, the Millennium Cohort Study has enrolled tens of thousands of participants who have deployed in support of the global war on terrorism, said Navy Cmdr. (Dr.) Margaret Ryan, the study's principal investigator and director of the Defense Department Center for Deployment Health Research, part of the Naval Health Research Center, in San Diego.

The study was designed in the late 1990s "in the wake of the first Gulf War to answer some of the most difficult questions that couldn't really be answered retrospectively after that conflict," Ryan said.

The joint-service study was established to evaluate the health risks of military deployments, occupational exposures, and general military service, Ryan explained, noting that about 108,000 servicemembers have signed up to take part since program enrollment began in July 2001.

Participants' health is evaluated over a 21-year period, Ryan said, noting the size of the cohort -- the group participating in the study – likely will total more than 147,000 people.

"About 40 percent of our cohort has deployed to one of the more recent operations, either in Iraq or Afghanistan or surrounding regions, in support of the global war on terrorism," Ryan said.

Involvement in the study is voluntary, and participants are selected randomly, Ryan said. All information is secure and safeguarded, she added.

Participants report their health status every three years and can fill out either paper or online surveys, Ryan said.

"We do strongly encourage people to use the online option," Ryan said. "It's a very secure way to transmit information."

Dr. Tyler C. Smith will replace Ryan as the study's principal investigator later this year, as the Navy physician is slated to take a new duty assignment at Camp Pendleton, Calif.

The study is providing valuable data that will help military epidemiologists understand possible cause-and-effect relationships between combat-zone deployments and problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder, Smith said

"We have the ability to look at a large group of individuals who were deployed and not deployed," Smith said. "And we can see what factors predict new-onset PTSD, and how PTSD evolves over time. That's what we've been focusing on."

Evaluating the incidence of PTSD among servicemembers wasn't possible until recently, "simply because we didn't have a cohort in place like this that's large and population-based," Smith explained.

"So we're learning things that we really haven't been able to investigate in the past," he said.

No-dong-B

On 12 September 2003 it was reported that North Korea was working on a new missile, is based on the Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched missile. The North was thought to have acquired the technology sometime between 1992 and 1998. According to an un-named US Government official, "We've had hints of this for several years, but it's only within the last year that we've been able to confirm that this did exist and it's derived from Russian technology."

The official US Government nomenclature associated with this system is not known. The Nodong-1 designator derives from the standard US Government practice of naming a weapon systems after the most proximate placename associated with the site at which the system was first identified. Over time, the terminology Nodong-2 became associated with a lightweight version of the Nodong-1, and Nodong-3 and Nodong-4 were applied to systems subsequently designated Taep’o-dong-1 and Taep’o-dong-2. If the appearance at Mirin Airbase was the first time this SS-N-6 derivative was sighted by US intelligence, the new missile might be designated "Mirin-1" -- but for sake of simplicity we have allocated a provisional "Nodong-B" designator to this system. This would operate under the principle that single stage missiles derived from Soviet SLBM technology are of the class "Nodong" while multi-stage missiles are Taep’o-dong.

In May 2004 it was reported that prior to the Foundation Day parades on 09 September 2003, as many as ten of the missiles and five launchers were to Mirim Airbase, the preparation site for the parades. Although the missiles were not featured in the celebrations, they were noticed by Western intelligence, which prompted the news reports a few days later.

In early May 2004 South Korean newspapers reported that that in late 2003 and early 2004 US intelligence had identified construction of two new missile bases in North Korea. One facility is at Yangdok, 80 km [50 miles] east of Pyongyang, and the other base at Hochon in North Hamgyong province. By May 2004 the new bases were reportedly 70 percent to 80 percent complete.

Testifying before the parliament's National Defense Committee, ROK Defense Minister Cho Young-kil said 07 July 2004 that North Korea had deployed this new missile with a 1,860-2,500 mile range.

The missiles and mobile launchers at the sites were reportedly consistent with the new design, different from North Korea's Nodong missiles. The new system is apparently different from the North's Scud and Nodong families of missiles. According to one report, the new missile is 12 meters long and 1.5 meters in diameter. Although slightly smaller than the deployed Nodong missiles [which are variously estimated at 12.4 to 15 meters long and 1.3 meters in diameter], it has a longer range and can be launched from a mobile launcher. The new missile was assessed as having a range of between 2,750 km to 4,000 km [1,800 to 2,500 miles], thus capable of targeting American bases in Guam and Okinawa. The construction of the two facilities was taken to indicate that North Korea was sufficiently confident of the performance of the new missile to begin preparations to deploy it.

The reported 1.5 meter diameter is indeed consistent with that of the SS-N-6, but the reported length of 12 meters is a bit puzzling at first. The SS-N-6 had a total length of 9.65 meters, and a total length without warhead of 7.1 meters. It appears that the Nodong-B configuration incorates a 1.5 meter diameter engine compartment and propellant tank from the SS-N-6 configuration, and the 12 meter [length overall] results from adding the Nodong-1 reentry vehicle and interstage element. Variants of the SS-N-6 had ranges of 2,400 km and 3,200, consistent with the lower end of the reported range of the Nodong-B. It is plausible that another 1,000 km of range might have been achieved in the Nodong-B as a result of a longer propellant tank, though at the price of lower thrust-to-weight ratio and slower acceleration.

The intended role of the Nodong-B is unclear. While the Nodong-1/2 could target American facilities on Okinawa, these facilities are on Japanese territory. If the reported range of up to 4,000 kilometers is correct, the system could be used to target American facilties in Guam. Guam is an American posession, and thus the Nodong-B would give the North the potential to directly target American territory. Over-eager headline writers searching for a local angle notwithstanding, there seems little prospect that a single-stage Nodong-B could reach Hawaii, much less Los Angeles. Alternately, the Nodong-B might be intended for use with a [presumably] heavier uranium bomb design, maintaining the range coverage of the Nodong-1/2 which was presumably designed with a lighter plutonium bomb design.